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Abstract
December 1, 1996 Portugal introduced a new law on working hours which
gradually reduced the standard workweek from 44 hours to 40 hours. We
study how this mandatory working hours reduction aﬀected employment and
earnings of workers involved. We ﬁnd for workers who were aﬀected by the
new law that working hours decreased, while hourly wages increased, keep-
ing monthly earnings approximately constant. We also ﬁnd that the working
hours reduction did not lead to an increased job loss of workers directly af-
fected. Finally, we ﬁnd that workers who themselves were not directly aﬀected
were inﬂuenced by the working hours reduction indirectly. If they worked in
a ﬁrm with many workers working more than 40 hours before the change in
law was introduced.
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11 Introduction
In the past decades, working hours have been reduced in many countries, often with
the idea that a reduction of working time per worker would increase the number of
employed workers. However, empirical studies ﬁnd little if any support for positive
employment eﬀects of working hours reduction. For Germany, Hunt (1999) ﬁnds no
positive employment eﬀects of the gradual working time reduction that occurred in
the 1980s and 1990s. Andrews et al. (2005) also ﬁnd no evidence of positive em-
ployment eﬀects of working hours reduction in Germany. For France, Cr´ epon and
Kramarz (2002) study the 1982 reduction of the workweek in France from 40 to 39
hours ﬁnding that it didn’t create jobs but increased unemployment. Estev˜ ao and
S´ a (2008) study the further reduction of the workweek in France from 39 to 35 hours
in 2000-2002. They ﬁnd an increase in labor turnover but no eﬀect on aggregate em-
ployment. Skuterud (2007) presents an analysis of the Canadian province of Quebec
where the standard workweek was gradually reduced from 44 to 40 hours concluding
that the policy failed to raise employment. Varej˜ ao (2005) investigates the eﬀects of
a 1996 working time reduction in Portugal ﬁnding that ﬁrms’ reaction to the policy
is aﬀected by the presence of minimum wage earners and the use of overtime hours.
In addition to the country studies Kapteyn et al. (2004) analyze cross-country dif-
ferences in actual working hours which they interpret as work-sharing assuming that
the reductions in actual working hours are driven by changes in standard hours.1
They ﬁnd that work-sharing has a signiﬁcant positive long-run eﬀect on the wage
rate and a positive but insigniﬁcant long-run eﬀect on employment.
This paper investigates the eﬀects of a working time reduction in Portugal. De-
cember 1, 1996 Portugal introduced a new law on working hours which gradually
reduced the standard workweek from 44 hours to 40 hours.2 Our contribution of
this paper to the literature on working hours reduction is twofold. First, we present
a more detailed analysis of potential eﬀects. In order to assess the working hours re-
1Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence that actual hours follow standard hours. The analysis
of Kapteyn et al. (2004) is based on data from 16 OECD countries over the time period 1960-2001.
2This working hours reduction is also studied by Varej˜ ao (2005). Our study is distinct from his
study because we also take potential ﬁrm eﬀects into account.
2duction policy we analyze its eﬀects on normal hours of work, overtime hours, hourly
wages, monthly earnings and the probability of job loss. Second, we use matched
worker-ﬁrm data which allow us to study the eﬀects of working hours reduction
taking ﬁrm eﬀects into account.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the nature of the
working hours reduction in Portugal as well as our data. Section 3 presents the
empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Working hours in Portugal
2.1 The working hours reduction
In Portugal, the 1990s was a decade with unemployment rates that were low, about
3-4%-points below the EU-15 average. Initially unemployment rates increased some-
what to a maximum of about 7% in the mid 1990s, to decrease to 4% in the late
1990s. Portugal has a highly regulated and centralized labor market, with minimum
wages, strong employment protection, and collective bargaining widely applied (Car-
doso (2006)).
December 1, 1996 a new law was introduced with the aim of gradually reducing
the standard workweek from 44 to 40 hours. The law was not passed as a tool
to create jobs and reduce unemployment but it was introduced because the newly-
elected government wanted to speed up convergence of the traditionally long hours
of work in Portugal to the European average (Varej˜ ao (2005)).
The new law implied a reduction of working hours in two steps. First, at 1st De-
cember 1996 all workweeks above 42 hours should be reduced by 2 hours; workweeks
below 42 hours but above 40 hours should meet the new standard of 40 hours per
week. Second, at 1st December 1997, all workweeks should meet the new standard
of 40 hours.
Workers were still allowed to work overtime, with an overtime premium of 50% for
the ﬁrst hour and 75% for additional overtime hours. Of course, with the reduction
of standard working hours, hours in the range 40-44 became more expensive so the
3ﬁrms had an incentive to reduce working hours. In order to compensate ﬁrms for the
reduction in working hours the new law introduced some ﬂexibility: the reduction
was implemented taking into account that the normal workweek could be deﬁned
on a 4 months average. It was allowed to increase the maximum number of hours
with 2 hours per day if the total did not exceed 10 hours per day and 50 hours per
week.
2.2 Our data
In our analysis we use a longitudinal data set matching ﬁrms and workers in the
Portuguese economy, called Quadros de Pessoal (QP – “Lists of Personnel”). The
data are gathered annually by the Ministry of Employment, based on an inquiry
that every establishment with wage-earners is legally obliged to ﬁll in. Reported
data cover all the personnel working for the establishment in a reference week. A
worker identiﬁcation code, based on a transformation of the social security number,
enables tracking the worker over time. Every year QP gathers information for more
than 200 thousand ﬁrms and 2 million workers (see Cardoso (2006) for more details).
Until 1993 data were collected in March, from 1994 onwards data collection occurred
in October. Because of the change in month of data collection we use data from
1994 onwards.3
QP includes detailed information on the personal characteristics of each worker
and ﬁrm. Our analysis focuses on workers who are full-time wage earners, i.e.
workers working more than 35 hours per week.4 We dropped individuals with missing
information on normal hours of work and monthly earnings. The period before the
introduction of the working hours covers October 1994 to October 1996. According
to the way the law was implemented, the impact of the law is expected to take more
3We exploit a 10% random sample using the Stata sampling procedure “sample2”. This pro-
cedure allows the creation of a random sample by clusters of observations. Once an individual is
randomly chosen all observations of this individual are sampled. Thus a sample with the original
panel characteristics of the population is created.
4The main reason is that workers working less than 35 hours may have a diﬀerent attachment
to the labor market.
4than a year to completely take eﬀect. We consider the situation in October 1997
to represent the short term eﬀects of the December 1996 change in law, while the
situation in October 1998 is assumed to represent the long term eﬀects.
Our main variables are deﬁned as follows. Normal hours are deﬁned as the hours
worked during a normal week. This measure excludes irregular or unusual overtime,
work for premium pay, regular pay, or no pay at all, and by unusual absence or rest.
Overtime hours are deﬁned as the time worked in addition to the hours worked
during normal periods of work, having a higher hourly wage rate than the normal
rate.5 Monthly earnings are the monthly payments associated with the normal hours
of work. We use the national consumer price index to transform nominal earnings
into real ones. The hourly wage is computed as the ratio of monthly earnings and
normal hours of work. The worker is considered to lose his job in 2 situations. First,
if he comes in our sample twice in the same year, in which case we consider he
changed job, with or without an intermediate spell of unemployment. Second, if he
disappears from our sample for at least one year, in which case we assume that the
worker became unemployed or left the labor force.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Stylized facts
Table 1 shows that in the period October 1994-1996 on average 22% of the Por-
tuguese workers had a normal workweek between 40 and 42 hours, while 30% had
a workweek of more than 42 hours. So, half of the Portuguese workers was aﬀected
by the reduction in working hours. By October 1997 the percentage of workers
working more than 40 hours decreased to 38 and by October 1998 only 9% of the
workers worked more than 40 hours.6 The histograms in ﬁgures 1 and 2 show the
5QP collects information on both normal and overtime hours collected in the reference month
and a posteriori we transformed them into the week reference.
6Note that formally in October 1998 all workers had to have a workweek of at most 40 hours;
The explanation of us ﬁnding that 9% of workers is working more than 40 hours per week is
twofold. First, the transformation of monthly to weekly hours information may introduce some
5distribution of usual and total workers hours before and after the introduction of
the new working hours law. Clearly, the fraction of workers working more than 40
hours clearly decreased and almost disappeared after 1997.
Table 1 shows that the number of individuals working part-time is not large and
this number doesn’t change much over time. As was to be expected working hours
reduced substantially, with the category 35-40 increasing with 17%-points between
October 1996 and 1997, and further increasing with 26%-points between October
1997 and 1998. The category 40-42 hours initially didn’t change much, while the
category of more than 42 hours almost completely vanished in two steps of about
equal size.
The law concerning the reduction of the workweek was introduced sudden and
unexpected. Thus, the impact of the law can be analyzed as if it was a “natural
experiment”. In our analysis we assume that the workers working 35-40 hours per
week in October 1996 are the control group, i.e. these workers are not directly
aﬀected by the reduction of working hours. The workers working more than 40
hours are aﬀected by the policy change. Because the working hours reduction was
implemented in two steps that aﬀected the hours categories 40-42 and above 42
diﬀerently we distinguish two treatment groups accordingly. Table 2 shows how
workers in various hours categories changed working hours or lost their job; the upper
part presents the changes in usual hours while the lower part presents the changes
in total working hours. Panel a presents the changes before the introduction of the
working hours law. As shown many workers do not change their hours category, but
there is also a large fraction of individuals who loose their job (22 to 29%), specially
in the categories over 40 hours. Panel b shows the transition by working hours
categories from October 1996 to October 1997. This panel shows what happens
to workers in the control group and both treatment groups. Panel c shows the
diﬀerences between the changes presented in panels a and b. The control group is
aﬀected only by the economic cycle, whereas both treatment groups are aﬀected by
the cycle and by the workings hours law. If we take the diﬀerence of the diﬀerences
measurement error. Second, as explained before under the new law the normal workweek was
deﬁned on a 4 months average. Therefore, for the reference week normal hours could exceed 40.
6between both treatment groups and the control group we get a ﬁrst impression of the
eﬀects of the change in mandatory working hours. These diﬀerences in diﬀerences
are shown in panel d. Clearly the policy change did not have a large eﬀect on the
probability of job loss, but there were clear and sizeable eﬀects on the distributions
of working hours.
3.2 Parameter estimates
As indicated before, we analyze the impact of the reduction of the workweek as if the
policy change resembles a natural experiment. The treatment groups consist of all
individuals who worked more than 40 hours in October 1996, either 40-42 or 42+.
The control group consists of workers who worked 35-40 hours in October 1996.
To establish the eﬀects of the working week reduction we estimate the following
equations using QP data from October 1994 - October 1998:
∆yit = βxit + (δ1h4042,i + δ2h42p,i)d96,it + (δ3h4042,i + δ4h42p,i)d97,it + it (1)
where ∆y, the dependent variable, represents changes in normal hours, overtime
hours, hourly wages, monthly wages and employment status for individual i in the
period from October in year t to October in year t + 1. Furthermore, x represents
a vector of personal characteristics. Included in x are d96 and d97, dummy variables
indicating calendar years and h4042 and h42p dummy variables representing working
hours categories, 40-42 hours per week and more than 42 hours per week respectively.
Both categories are deﬁned on the basis of the situation in October 1996, just before
the introduction of the working time reduction. Finally, β is a vector of parameters,
the δ’s are also parameters while  is an error term.
Assuming that the general calendar time eﬀects are represented by the calendar
year dummies and assuming that the time-invariant work hours-speciﬁc eﬀects are
represented by the working hours categories, the interaction terms represent the
treatment eﬀects. Our main interest concerns the short-run treatment eﬀects repre-
sented by δ1 and δ2, and the long-run eﬀects represented by δ3 and δ4. The relevant
parameter estimates are presented in Table 3.
7As expected normal hours go down substantially. Overtime hours increase in
the ﬁrst year, but in the second year they are approximately constant. Apparently,
the initial reduction of normal working hours is partly compensated by an increase
in overtime hours although this eﬀect is small. Hourly wages for workers aﬀected
increase, leaving monthly earnings approximately constant. Somewhat surprisingly
the aﬀected workers in the category 40-42 hours have a lower probability to lose
their job than non-aﬀected workers. This may be explained by the ﬂexibility that
ﬁrms could use on this group of workers.
So far, we only considered individual direct eﬀects of the policy change ignoring
ﬁrm eﬀects. However, it may be that the eﬀects are inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm share of
workers that worked more than 40 hours per week. Firms that had many workers
who were potentially aﬀected may have responded diﬀerent from ﬁrms that only
had a few aﬀected workers. To investigate this possibility we add to equation (1) a
number of interaction terms:7
∆yit = βxit + (ζ1.n + (δ1 + ω1.n)h4042,i + (δ2 + ω2.n)h42p,i)d96,it
+(ζ2.n + (δ3 + ω3.n)h4042,i + (δ4 + ω4.n)h42p,i)d97,it + it (2)
where n represents the share of workers in the ﬁrm in worker i that worked more than
40 hours in October 1996. To the extent that the ω’s diﬀer from zero the composition
of the workforce aﬀects the treatment eﬀect. The ζ parameters represent the eﬀects
of the working hours reduction on workers who themselves were not directly aﬀected.
These eﬀects originate from spillover eﬀects because the position of a worker in a
ﬁrm with many aﬀected workers is diﬀerent from the position of a worker in a ﬁrm
with few aﬀected workers.
Looking ﬁrst in Table 4 to the eﬀect on the aﬀected workers we see that the ﬁrm’s
share of aﬀected workers does not aﬀect the number of normal hours aﬀected workers
do in October 96-97 but in October 97-98 it decreases signiﬁcantly the number of
hours the 42+ hours group does. The ﬁrm’s share of aﬀected workers decreases
the hourly wage of aﬀected workers in October 96-97 but it increases it in October
7And, we also added ni to the equation to make sure that the ω-parameters represent the
treatment eﬀects.
897-98. Aﬀected workers have a lower probability of loosing their job if the ﬁrm has
a large share of aﬀected workers both in October 96-97 and October 97-98.
Other important parameters of interest concern the ζ’s representing the short run
and long run eﬀects of the ﬁrm’s share of aﬀected workers on workers not directly
aﬀected by the working hours reduction. As shown, those non-directly aﬀected
workers were nevertheless aﬀected signiﬁcantly. Non-aﬀected workers increase the
number of hours they work if the proportion of aﬀected workers in the ﬁrm is large.
Non-aﬀected workers have a bigger probability of loosing their job if the ﬁrm has a
large share of aﬀected workers.
As shown in Table 4 ω1 and ω2 are often insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero indi-
cating that in the short run the composition of the workforce is not very important.
However, since the other ω-parameters often diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero, in the
long-run the treatment eﬀect is inﬂuenced by the workforce composition.
Table 5 gives an idea of the size of the ﬁrm eﬀects by presenting treatment
eﬀects calculated on the basis of the parameter estimates of Table 4. From these
calculations we draw two conclusions. First, the treatment eﬀects are bigger – in
absolute terms – for workers who worked more than 42 hours per week, with one
exception, the employment eﬀect. Workers in the category 40-42 hours are less likely
to lose their job than workers working fewer or more hours. Our second conclusion
concerns the ﬁrm eﬀects. Most of the treatment eﬀects do not depend on the share
of workers working 40 hours or more. Apparently, the ﬁrm eﬀects are signiﬁcant but
quantitatively not very important. The only exception concerns the long term eﬀects
on employment. Somewhat surprisingly, the employment eﬀects are more favorable
the higher the share of workers working more than 40 hours. Our interpretation of
this phenomenon is that there are negative spillover eﬀects aﬀecting the employment
of workers that worked less than 40 hours per week.
4 Conclusions
The reduction of working hours in Portugal was mandated by law in 1996. Its objec-
tives was to reduce the workweek from 44 to 40 hours and to increase ﬂexibility. The
9change in law was not intended as an instrument to increase employment through
work-sharing. The reduction of working hours from 44 to 40 directly aﬀected about
half of all workers in Portugal since they were working more than 40 hours per
week prior to the introduction of the law. The law was introduced in a sudden and
unexpected way, which allowed us to establish its eﬀects as if it was a “natural”
experiment.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Initially, the reduction of working hours was
compensated by the use of overtime. Hourly wages of the aﬀected workers increased,
reducing their monthly wage only slightly. Workers in the category 40-42 hours were
less likely to lose their job. We also ﬁnd that workers who themselves are not directly
aﬀected by the working hours reduction experience eﬀects if they are in a ﬁrm with
many workers that were aﬀected.
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11Table 1: Proportion of workers in each hour category; normal working
hours
October ∆ ∆
1994-1996 1997 1998 1994/6-97 1997-98
<35 11 8 11 -3 3
35-40 37 54 80 17 26
40-42 22 23 8 1 -15
>42 30 15 1 -15 -14
Total 100 100 100 0 0
12Table 2: Transition rates given usual hour category in t
Usual hours
t + 1
t Loose job < 35 35-40 41-42 > 42 Total
a. 1994-1995 35-40 22 4 61 12 1 100
41-42 25 2 11 59 3 100
>42 29 3 10 25 33 100
b. 1996 35-40 21 3 70 6 0 100
41-42 24 2 30 43 1 100
>42 25 2 14 45 14 100
c. 4 35-40 -1 -1 9 -6 -1 0
41-42 -1 0 19 -16 -2 0
>42 -4 -1 4 20 -19 0
d. 44 41-42 0 1 10 -10 -1 0
>42 -3 0 -5 26 -18 0
Usual plus overtime hours
t + 1
t Loose job < 35 35-40 41-42 > 42 Total
a. 1994-1995 35-40 23 4 58 13 2 100
41-42 25 2 11 56 5 100
>42 21 2 10 25 42 100
b. 1996 35-40 21 2 68 8 1 100
41-42 24 2 29 42 3 100
>42 22 2 14 36 26 100
c. 4 35-40 -2 -2 10 -5 -1 0
41-42 -1 0 18 -14 -3 0
>42 0 -4 14 -9 -1 0
d. 44 41-42 1 2 8 -9 -2 0
>42 2 -2 4 -4 0 0
Source: QP
13Table 3: Parameter estimates - baseline model
Normal Overtime Hourly Monthly Non
hours hours wage earnings employment
Short run eﬀects
40-42 hours (δ1) -1.52 (35.8)** 0.06 (2.6)** 3.65 (13.5)** -0.47 (1.6) -4.94 (13.6)**
42+ hours (δ2) -3.58 (95.2)** 0.08 (4.8)** 8.26 (34.9)** -0.57 (2.2)** 0.01 (0.0)
Long run eﬀects
40-42 hours (δ3) -0.88 (18.2)** 0.05 (2.2)** 2.92 (11.4)** 0.49 (1.7)* -5.73 (16.4)**
42+ hours (δ4) -2.39 (55.3)** 0.02 (1.4) 5.88 (25.9)** 0.05 (0.2) -0.01 (0.3)
R
2
0.085 0.0001 0.011 0.013 0.040
Note: Ordinary least squares; ﬁrst four columns based on 415,863 observations, the ﬁfth
column based on 536,997 observations; parameter estimates of control variables are not
represented; control variables include calendar year dummies for 1996 and 1997, working
hours dummies for categories 40-42 hours and more than 42 hours, industry (10 categories),
region (7 categories), education (8 categories), wage (5 categories)(not included in the
wage and earnings regressions), size of ﬁrm (4 categories) and tenure. The population
includes all full-time workers in the private sector working between 35 and 50 hours.
absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses, a **/* indicates that
the coeﬃcient is diﬀerent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signiﬁcance.
14Table 4: Additional parameter estimates
Normal Overtime Hourly Monthly Non
hours hours wage earnings employment
Short run eﬀects
40-42 hours
δ1 -2.49 (-20.3)** 0.02 (0.2) 6.04 (7.1)** -1.37 (-1.5) -3.63 (-3.4)**
ω1 -0.02 (-0.1) -0.01 (-0.1) -2.39 (-2.1)** -1.49 (-1.2) -3.34 (-2.3)**
42+ hours
δ2 -4.67 (-35.9)** 0.00 (0.1) 9.96 (13.2)** -1.59 (-1.9)* 0.32 (0.3)
ω2 -0.21 (-1.3) 0.03 (0.4) -1.33 (-1.3) -1.41 (-1.3) -1.97 (-1.5)
35-40 hours
ζ1 1.89 (19.9)** 0.09 (2.4)** -1.44 (-2.3)** 3.61 (5.3)** 1.83 (2.3)**
Long run eﬀects
40-42 hours
δ3 0.04 (0.3) -0.11 (-1.8)* 0.77 (1.1) 0.83 (1.0) -1.27 (-1.3)
ω3 -2.42 (-12.7)** 0.21 (2.3)** 3.22 (3.3)** -3.65 (-3.2)** -10.18 (-7.3)**
42+ hours
δ4 -1.93 (-14.2)** -0.02 (-0.5) 5.39 (8.1)** 0.65 (0.8) 5.24 (5.9)**
ω4 -1.73 (-9.3)** 0.04 (0.6) 0.75 (0.8) -4.02 (-3.7)** -11.09 (-8.9)**
35-40 hours
ζ2 1.49 (15.1)** 0.03 (0.8) -0.14 (-0.3) 4.30 (6.9)** 5.11 (6.9)**
R
2 0.089 0.0002 0.014 0.003 0.040
F 166.44 (0.0)** 2.07 (0.0)** 20.43 (0.0)** 9.06 (0.0)** 18.19 (0.0)**
Note: Ordinary least squares; ﬁrst four columns based on 415,863 observations, the ﬁfth
column based on 536,997 observations; parameter estimates of control variables are not
represented; control variables include calendar year dummies for 1996 (d96,it) and 1997
(d97,it), working hours dummies for categories 40-42 hours and more than 42 hours, the
ﬁrm share of workers aﬀected by the policy change (ni), industry (10 categories), region
(7 categories), education (8 categories), wage (5 categories)(not included in the wage and
earnings regressions), size of ﬁrm (4 categories) and tenure. The population includes
all full-time workers in the private sector working between 35 and 50 hours. absolute
t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses; the F-statistic concerns a
comparison of the estimation results in this table and the previous table (Table 3); a **/*
indicates that the coeﬃcient is diﬀerent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signiﬁcance.
15Table 5: Simulated eﬀects of working time reduction
Weekly working hours 35-40 40-42 >42
% of workers aﬀected 25 50 25 50 25 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short run eﬀects
Normal hours 0.5 1.0 -2.5 -2.5 -4.7 -4.8
Overtime hours 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hourly wage (%) -0.6 -1.2 5.4 4.8 9.6 9.3
Monthly earnings (%) 0.9 1.8 -1.7 -2.1 -1.9 -2.3
Job loss (%) 0.5 0.9 -4.5 -5.3 -0.2 -0.7
Long run eﬀects
Normal hours 0.4 0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -2.4 -2.8
Overtime hours 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Hourly wage (%) -0.0 -0.1 1.6 2.4 5.6 5.8
Monthly earnings (%) 1.1 2.2 -0.1 -1.0 -0.4 -1.4
Job loss (%) 1.3 2.6 -3.8 -6.4 2.5 -0.3
Note: The percentage of workers aﬀected concerns the workers that worked more than 40
hours per week in October 1996; the calculations are based on the parameter estimates of
the lower part of Table 4
16Figure 1: Usual working hours before and after introduction of the working



















17Figure 2: Total working hours (usual + overtime) before and after intro-
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